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Marginality, adaptation and farming
in the New Zealand high country
Steven Kelly et Willie Smith
1 Exceptionally severe snowstorms can and do pose a serious hazard to people in New
Zealand’s upland and mountain areas (Burrows, 1976). Two-thirds of the country is steep
or mountainous and over 75% of the land area is above 200 m. New Zealand’s history and
cultural heritage have contributed to patterns of settlement and land use in these areas
that are very different to comparable Alpine areas in Europe (Jeanneret et al., 2001). The
population in New Zealand’s mountains is small and widely scattered. Settlements are
few, and the road network is thin.
2 European settlement resulted in the establishment of large pastoral farms (runs). In the
High Country, typically defined as land over 700 m and broadly equated with the Alpine
zone in Europe (Swaffield and Hughey, 2001) such runs remain today. Over time in more
lowland areas these have been subdivided and land use intensified. This legacy impacts
on current community structures and farm systems.
3 This paper examines the impact on farms and farm households of the snowstorm which
swept Canterbury in June, 2006. Worst hit was South Canterbury (Figure 1). The region
stretches west and inland from the coastal flats and foothills (which reach heights of over
2,300 m) to the Mackenzie Country, an intermontane basin at 700-800 m and the Southern
Alps which rise several thousand metres higher. In the foothills, farms typically average
between  180  and  500 hectares.  In  the  mountains,  runs  can  exceed  10,000 hectares,
although stocking densities may be as low as one per hectare (Metherell, 1997). Despite
low stocking rates, such properties can generate substantial incomes and this, reinforced
by their history and lifestyle, has long been viewed as granting runholders an element of
social  distinction  which  in  large  part  they  still  retain  (Hatch,  1992).  The  research
addressed the full range of farm types.
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Figure 1. Location of the study area
 
Methods
4 The iterative approach adopted was based on grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967)
involving  detailed  interviews,  data  collection  and  triangulation  to  reflect  the  lived
experiences of those directly involved in the event, and validate findings. Sampling, in
line with grounded theory, was not statistically based, but determined by the relevance of
the sample to the scope of the work. Thirty-two semi-structured interviews were carried-
out with farm households; seven with Civil Defence officials and others involved in the
relief effort. Interviews were backed by an analysis of newspapers and other published
materials.  The  interviews  were  conducted  in  February-April,  2007  (Smith,  2007)  and
allowed the collection of primary information to assess farmers’ perception of the storm,
its impact and their household and community response. 
5 Of the sample farms, 7 were in the High Country (or Alpine zone), 12 in the foothills, and
13  on  the  coastal  plains.  Sheep  farming  dominates  the  region.  However,  all  those
interviewed also grew some proportion of their own winter feed. In the High Country and
foothills, sheep were frequently raised in association with deer and beef. On the plains,
farms were more diverse; 6 were dairy farms, two raised pigs, and cropping was both
more intensive and more important than elsewhere.
 
The 2006 snowstorm and its impact
6 Snow began falling on the night of 11 June and continued into the morning of the 12 June.
Forecast  to reach down to 500 m,  snow accumulated to 30 cm,  even at  sea level  and
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commonly exceeded 70 cm towards the foothills. In the Mackenzie Basin, snow depths
decreased closer to 40-50 cm (Hendrikx, 2007).
7 The storm caused considerable damage to electricity distribution systems and resulted in
the failure of phone services and other forms of electronic communication. In some areas
electricity and phones remained out of action for more than three weeks (Wilson et al.,
2009). Most major roads were cleared and reopened after two or three days. Side roads
remained blocked for over a week. Farmers who had suitable equipment often assisted in
clearing  the  back  roads.  But  many  roads  were  only  partially  cleared  and  farmers
complained of access from their driveways being blocked by snow deposited as major
roads were cleared.
8 The snow created significant extra work for farmers. The immediate task was to check on
stock. For those with sheep trapped in the snow, this involved up to a week of “snow
raking”  (digging sheep out  of  snow drifts),  a  demanding task.  Elsewhere  stock were
rescued using four  wheel  drive  tractors  and brought to  where feeding-out  would be
easier.  Because  of  the  depth of  the  snow and the  need to  wear  cumbersome,  heavy
clothing  this  was  still  exhausting  and  time  consuming.  Diesel  froze  and  there  were
frequent equipment failures. Short winter daylight hours left farmers with little time to
tackle other tasks. In terms of insurance payouts the snowstorm is thought to have been
the most expensive of recent decades (Hendrikx, 2007).
9 June 2006 was the coldest in over 50 years, and frosts froze the snow so that it remained
in some parts for up to seven weeks (Wilson et al.,  2009). Coupled with the threat of
another storm, this took a psychological and physical toll on farmers as they toiled day
after day in freezing conditions leaving many at their wits’  end. Some: “…questioned
whether farming was the right profession” (Sheep/deer farmer).
10 Despite  lobbying  by  farm  groups,  Civil  Defence  never  declared  an  official  state  of
emergency. Some argued this would have increased the level of government aid, allowed
the greater use of military resources, and generated a faster government response. Civil
Defence,  however,  believe  that  such  a  declaration  would  have  made  no  difference
(Interview,  Civil  Defence  Official,  Timaru,  April 18,  2007).  This  highlights  a  political
dimension of the relief effort that drew-in the Prime Minister, farm associations, and
even the military in debate on the assistance provided (New Zealand Herald, 2006), echoing
the politicisation of disaster management identified elsewhere (e.g. Bankoff, 2002).
11 The  impact  of  the  storm  was  severe  and  long-lasting.  All  but  one  of  the  farmers
interviewed  acknowledged  that  the  snow  “put  them  back  a  bit”  financially  and
psychologically.  Fifty-percent  (16/32)  acknowledged  that  the  snow  had  generated
significant stress often compounded by financial concerns; only 1 of these farmers was in
the  High  Country.  The  cumulative  effects  of  damage  to  farms  and  farm equipment,
coupled with the flow-on effects from delayed maintenance and upgrading also meant
that farmers were unable to take a break between seasons. Lack of “time-out” and the
other impacts of the snow exposed the vulnerability of many farms and farm households.
 
Preparation and isolation
12 Nine months after the snowstorm farmers reflected that it had been “not too traumatic”
and believed they had recovered reasonably well. However, the loss of stock condition
and lower breeding rates, as well as additional costs generated by the storm meant that
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most (22/32) faced on-going financial costs. Contrary to Civil Defence and other officials
directly involved in the recovery effort, farmers believed that they had been prepared for
a snowstorm. This they attributed to experience and their awareness of the risk of snow.
Most  of  those  interviewed  (30/32)  had  experienced  at  least  one  previous  hazard,
including the major snows of 1992, 1973, 1967, as well as floods, droughts, rabbits, and
hail. Most farmers indeed had made some conscious preparation for snow (29/32). Most
had four-wheel drive tractors, shelter belts and a policy of going into winter with a store
of stock feed of between 1½ to 2½ times an average winter’s needs. Some farmers had an
attachment  for  their  tractor  to  help  clear  the  snow  (14/32)  and  a  few  (3/32)  had
bulldozers. All had some level of insurance coverage.
13 All surveyed households had log burning stoves most of which also heated their water.
Most  too  had  a  wood stove  for  cooking,  a  gas  barbecue,  candles,  torches,  batteries,
camping gear and enough food for one to two weeks. Log burners (especially those that
could be used for cooking) and stoves that also heated the water were widely described as
indispensable. Most households survived reasonably comfortably.
14 Those least prepared suffered most and were mainly farms on the plains. This confirms
the  findings  of  other  studies  (Smith  et  al.,  2011).  Importantly,  they  were  also  less
accustomed  to  snow.  They  also  had  fewer  resources,  less  resident  labour  and  less
necessary equipment. Access to resources has repeatedly been shown as fundamental to
coping in adversity (e.g. Blaikie et al., 1994). Closer to town such households frequently
had one household member whose primary employment was off the farm (8/13), and had
adapted to the convenience shopping associated with urban living, perhaps even buying
bread on a daily basis. This contrasts with life on these same farms just a generation
previous when transport links were much more difficult.
15 The loss of power for up to two weeks in some areas caused electric fences to fail and
allowed cattle to mob. In much of the study area, power cuts occur for a few days, most
winters.  But  farmers  were  ill  prepared  for  cuts  of  such  long  duration.  Of  those
interviewed  some  (19/32)  had  generator  back-up.  But  commonly  this  only  provided
power for domestic use, for maintaining a water pump or a freezer. From a business
perspective, dairy or pig farmers faced serious management problems with a cut of more
than 24-48 hours. There was indeed no one critical threshold, as the impact of an outage
varied with the nature of the farm system. Invariably, the power outage was cause of
annoyance; it was not, however, the worst impact of the snow.
16 There was unanimity that the single greatest problem was enforced isolation. This was
partly due to road closures,  but particularly as a result  of  the loss of  cellular phone
coverage. The region as a whole lost land lines for between three and seven days. Cell
phone coverage was out for up to 14 days following the failure of transmitting stations.
There was a broad consensus that  while households could cope with the power cuts
lasting a few days,  and that a couple of days isolation because of road closures were
tolerable, prolonged lack of phone communications was unacceptable.
17 In the immediate aftermath of the storm, the loss of phone services reduced the ability to
check on extended family, neighbours, and friends. This increased the sense of isolation.
Safety issues were also a concern. Farmers related how they or their neighbour while
using their  tractor had slipped into snow-covered ditches or gullies.  Without phones
there was little chance of medical help. Because of the terrain, cell phone reception is
patchy at best, but farmers with reasonable reception on their properties routinely carry
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one as a safety measure. When partners did not return from snow raking when expected
and there was no way to make contact, families worried. When cell phone coverage was
re-established, phones remained useless until power was restored and phone batteries
charged. 
 
Community resilience
18 The timing of the snowstorm 12 June meant that lambing and calving had not started.
Had it occurred later in the winter, stock losses would have been high. In 2006, a dry
summer and autumn, however, meant that winter feed supplies were being used as early
as February. In consequence many farms already had low feed stocks when winter started
and the storm hit.  As a  result,  there was widespread agreement among farmers and
government officials that a second snowstorm would have caused devastating stock losses
as by then feed stocks would have been run down or exhausted and animals in poor
condition.
19 In most areas,  farmers had checked on their neighbours by the afternoon of  12 June
however  physical  help  was  often  initially  limited  as  farmers  addressed  their  own
immediate needs. Over the following days, spare camping gear and barbecues were lent
and meals and hot showers offered to those in need. Much of this assistance came from
other farmers and family members, but contractors, farm employees, farm suppliers and
different  service  organisations,  including  the  Red  Cross,  all  offered  assistance.  This
included visits, help with snow raking and feeding out, the loan of machinery, clearing
roads  and trees,  the  removal  of  dead stock,  babysitting,  cooking meals  and washing
clothes, and the provision of food parcels. Generators were also moved around to charge
freezers.  This  response  reinforces  the  views  recurrent  in  other  research,  of  the
importance of social capital in hazard mitigation and the need for public involvement in
disaster planning and recovery (see, for example, Pearce, 2003). Farmers acknowledged
that they were overwhelmed by the support received, but also noted that in a way they
expected it, as “that is the kind of community we have here” (Intensive sheep farmer).
Mutual assistance also renewed community spirit. This was unanimously described as a
powerful positive outcome of the storm. And confirmed the importance of neighbours
and community members as the most immediate help in a crisis; a viewpoint routinely
identified in advisory material concerning adverse events, including that designed for the
rural  population (Civil  Defence Canterbury,  undated).  Community self-help reinforced
farmers’ own self-image as rugged, independent, individuals, often cynical and dismissive
of official assistance, especially where that might be construed as a “hand-out”. As one
sheep/beef  farmer  put  it:  “farms  are  just  like  any  other  business.  Farmers  need  to
practise risk management and be self-sufficient”.
20 In  practice,  over  time  an  increasing  amount  of  official  assistance  was  required  and
provided.  Farmers’  asserted  claims  of  self-reliance  did  not  necessarily  lessen  their
expectation of  assistance and many farmers later  complained bitterly at  the level  of
assistance provided.
21 Initial official assistance, coordinated through Civil Defence, was severely hampered by
the collapse of the communications network. Some of its own staff couldn’t get to work
because  of  blocked  roads,  and  there  were  problems  of  coordination  and  delays  in
determining the scale and level of need (Wilson et al.,  2009).  Two years later,  lessons
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learned resulted  in  better  co-ordination between Civil  Defence  and four-wheel  drive
clubs, and improvements to volunteer training (Otago Daily Times, 2008).
22 As  time  went  on,  however,  helicopters  and  four-wheel  drive  vehicles  were  used  to
determine how people were coping. Where helicopters landed on farms these visits were
greatly appreciated and the desire for some face-to-face, physical contact was repeatedly
identified by farm families as a primary need. However, others found out later that Civil
Defence had in fact flown over their property, seen movement, and ticked them off as OK,
not improving popular perceptions of the support provided. As one farmer noted: “how
could Civil Defence possibly tell from a helicopter what problems were happening on the
farm or in the home?” (Extensive sheep farmer).
23 Civil Defence supplied hot meals and showers to families and used local pubs and camping
grounds as centres for such support activities. With communication links down, however,
some households remained unaware of what was available. Those who were aware and
took advantage were grateful. Initially farmers were often reluctant to accept such help,
but later were seen at the centres with their families. Food parcels, which included books,
games and magazines for both children and adults, were also distributed throughout the
region.
24 Other assistance came through Taskforce Green, a government programme that allows
people to develop work habits and job skills. Workers funded under this programme were
used mainly to remove fallen trees and branches and repair fences damaged in the storm.
For those farmers who took advantage of this, there was almost unanimous enthusiasm
for the service provided (11/12).
25 Most  anger  was  directed  at  the  failure  of  the  telecommunications  system:  “what
happened with the phones never should have occurred, especially not in this day and age
with the technology we now have” (Extensive sheep/beef/deer farmer).
26 Blame was largely directed at  the supply company (Telecom).  There was widespread
belief that the company had let them down and should be held accountable. This was
summed-up in the statement that: “farmers are expected to invest in being prepared, but
Telecom isn’t. They are too profit driven. They don’t get a return on their investment in
rural preparedness” (Dairy farmer).
27 Self-sufficiency, they argued, required the maintenance of basic infrastructure: “farmers
are  expected  to  be  self-sufficient.  We  can  only  be  independent  or  self-sufficient  if
essential services are operating” (Sheep/beef/deer farmer).
28 Farmers viewed cell phone coverage as central to their infrastructural needs. Privatised
in 1990,  there  was  also  a  belief  that  the  collapse  of  phone services  would  not  have
happened in the past, and that it remained a government responsibility to ensure service
provision.
 
Market pressures and technological dependency
29 Different types of farms, variable terrain, the location of farms and distance from town,
meant that the snowstorm had a unique impact on each household. However, common
themes included anger at the loss of communications and power, road closures, stress
from the damage experienced, problems feeding stock, and frustration at the duration of
the snow cover. Nevertheless, the resultant impact on economic production and stress
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levels showed a clear differentiation between those farms in the High Country and those
on the plains.
30 In the mountain and upland areas, customary local practice is to get stock down off the
higher grazing areas in April. When the storm hit, some farmers still had stock on these
higher areas. A dry summer and autumn had provided poor grazing. Despite the risks and
in  an  effort  to  increase  their  profits  (or  achieve  profitability)  officials  and  farmers
suggested that some had extended the grazing period on what were essentially summer
pastures. As one farmer explained: “bad management, exacerbated by the dry autumn,
meant some farmers pushed things to the limit” (Sheep/beef farmer).
31 There are no official data on regional stock losses, and fewer than half those interviewed
had experienced any stock losses (13/32); mainly sheep, but deer also fared particularly
badly,  especially  when  the  frosts  set  in.  Although  over-all  losses  are  accepted  as
significantly lower than in many earlier snowstorms, those that occurred highlight the
extent to which farmers may, in tight economic circumstances, take exceptional risks. In
2006, sheep and wool farmers had experienced almost 20 years of weak demand and poor
prices. In an economy uniquely exposed to global market pressures and without farm
subsidies or much other government support (Smith and Montgomery, 2004), there is a
risk that environmental boundaries may be exceeded. And this happened here.
32 Physically marginalised, farmers in the High Country overall were better prepared, less
vulnerable  and  more  resilient  than  many  of  their  counterparts  in  lower  lying,  less
physically marginal areas. This may be explained by the fact that farmers in the higher
areas commonly had more experience of snow and a greater expectation of severe storms
than farmers  on lower  areas.  Evidence  from this  research suggests  that  the  relative
vulnerability  and  resilience  of  the  two  groups  also  is  linked  to  differences  in  farm
structure and technological dependence.
33 Only one third of the sample farms had any resident paid labour. Of the 7, large, high
country  runs,  however,  6  did  have  resident  employees.  Much  farm  work,  including
fencing and shearing is now done by contract labour, hired on a short-term basis. This
contrasts to a few decades ago. At the same time, farm technology and farm practices
have changed. On the plains, smaller farms have adopted intensive land use practices and
substituted capital for labour to maintain their viability, a trend commonly evident in
New Zealand as elsewhere (Smith et al., 2010). Today hay and silage bails are too big to
handle without mechanical equipment or additional labour; and feeding out in snow, may
be  impossible  if  dependent  on  mechanised  equipment  which  fails  and  no  labour  is
available.  Rescuing  sheep  from  snow  requires  extra  physical  labour.  In  these
circumstances, a phone is almost the sole means to signal and obtain help. A tool which
provides increased resilience in adverse circumstances such as a medical emergency, fire,
or drought, exposes a new dependency and increased vulnerability when in a snowstorm
the service fails.
34 For those farm households with coverage, cell phones are now an integral part of life both
in a social context and as business tools. With phone services down, farmers noted the
stress  of  being  unable  to  maintain  daily  contact  with  scattered  family  members,
particularly with children away at school or university, or with elderly parents living off
the farm.
35 Framers in the High Country commonly have no cell  phone coverage,  or coverage is
patchy. Consequently, some have retained radio communication equipment that allowed
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them to  access  help.  As  noted,  some  larger  runs  in  particular  still  have  residential
workers.  Perhaps  more  importantly,  conscious  of  the  risk  of  snowstorms,  all  such
properties  had the resources  in place to manage such situations (7/7).  In effect,  the
marginalisation and risk long associated with mountain environments (e.g. Nicholson,
1963)  was  in  this  New  Zealand  example,  significantly  modified  by  the  size  of  the
properties and the range of equipment and other resources they retain. This is further
impacted  by  the  extent  to  which  these  farms  are  prepared  for  hazards,  and  their
heightened awareness that in the face of such events, the capacity to respond without
external help is essential.
36 The differential impact of the snowstorm on High Country farms and those on the plains
extends to the nature of the support they expected and required. On the smaller lowland
farms, there was a common acceptance of the need for counselling to relieve the stress
the  storm  induced.  Farmers  on  larger  High  Country  properties  often  dismissed
counselling as a waste of tax-payers’ money, prioritising direct economic support (often
in the form of free or subsidised stock feed).
 
Conclusions
37 Farm households in South Canterbury, and particularly in the High Country, are on a
daily basis faced with issues of isolation and few close neighbours. Modern technology
and communications have minimised these problems. When a hazard occurs, however, as
this  paper  has  shown,  for  some  such  disadvantages  may  be  reasserted  and  even
heightened.
38 In the most physically marginal areas, properties are generally larger, well established
and much better attuned to the prospect of snow. Typically they have greater financial
resources, a resident labour force, the necessary equipment to cope, and well developed,
long-established community links. They are also less dependent on cell phones. These
characteristics provided a powerful buffer against the most serious consequences of the
snowstorm.
39 Indeed, the snowstorm exposed the particular vulnerability of the lowland farmers. This
is  explained  by  their  lack  of  experience  and  low expectation  of  a  major  storm and
consequent lack of preparedness, their particular dependence on modern technological
aids, lack of ready access additional labour, and intensive (technologically dependent)
farm systems. These factors directly impacted on their ability to respond to the pressures
imposed  on  their  farm business  and  on  their  family  by  the  storm.  For  many  these
pressures  were  compounded  by  financial  constraints.  The  result  was  high  levels  of
psychological stress and long-term economic costs.
40 Recent decades have transformed the structure and coherence of rural communities in
modern industrial economies. These include new agricultural practices, a loss of farm
labour due to  technological  change,  and improved communication networks.  In  New
Zealand these changes have been accompanied by a withdrawal of farm subsidies leaving
the farm population particularly exposed to economic and market forces. As shown here,
the result includes new dependencies and new vulnerabilities that were exposed in the
face of a major hazardous event. Despite the physically marginal environment in which
High Country farmers live and work, the evidence presented here suggests that they have
achieved and maintain a dynamic social resilience in balance with that environment, a
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balance less fully developed in more intensive farm systems in less physically marginal
areas. 
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RÉSUMÉS
New Zealand’s mountain areas are sparsely populated, and the direct impact of disasters in these
areas  is  largely  on  agricultural  communities  and  communication  networks.  Subject  to
earthquakes (mainly in the Southern Alps) and volcanic eruptions (on the Central  Plateau of
North Island) New Zealand’s mountain areas are more generally subject to problems of erosion
and land slips and in the south, irregular, extreme snow falls. The impact of exceptionally heavy
snow falls over the past 150 years of European settlement is relatively well documented. While
modern technology might be thought to have lessened such impacts, the recent snowstorm of
2006  in  South  Canterbury  highlights  how  such  hazardous  events  continue  to  impact  on
communities  in  mountain  and  upland  areas.  The  increased  dependence  on  modern
communication technologies and changes in the operation and management of modern farm
systems are shown to compound the social and economic impact of such events. This impact is
significantly modified by the size and structure of the farms concerned.
INDEX
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